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Abstract: 	 We	estimate	the	marginal	benefits	of	increasing	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	for	beach	users	
in	Australia	and	the	United	States.	Visits,	income,	education,	age,	distance	from	a	patrol,	
and	willingness	to	swim	on	an	unpatrolled	beach	explain	willingness	to	pay	but	rivalry	
does	not;	snob	and	bandwagon	effects	prevail.	By	comparing	benefits	with	costs,	the	
levels	of	lifeguards	and	lifesavers	in	Australia	were	found	to	be	underprovided,	consistent	
with	shared	good	theory.	Increasing	services	provides	greater	net	benefits	to	users	but	
replacing	volunteer	lifesavers	with	paid	lifeguards	may	not	because	volunteering	brings	
broader	social	benefits.	
I.	IntrodUctIon
To whom can we turn in our time of need, when in treacherous seas, clawing for our last 
gasp of air, we are engulfed by a mountainous pounding wave?
They risk their own lives to save ours.
Surely these brave women and men, when called, are the flesh and blood of our Saviour. – 
one	of	the	many	services	provided	by	volunteer	lifesavers.
Safe	bathing	services	–	a	saviour	indeed	–	are	important	to	the	social	and	economic	wellbeing	
of	coastal	communities	around	the	globe,	including	those	of	Australia	and	the	United	States	
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(US).	despite	their	importance,	economic	theory	suggests	that	these	services,	because	they	
are	shared,	will	 tend	to	be	underprovided	(Buchanan	1965;	tisdell,	1984,	1980,	1977).	In	
2008,	 Surf	 Life	 Saving	Australia	 (SLSA),	Australia’s	 largest	 voluntary	 authority	 on	 safe	
bathing	services,	had	32,000	patrolling	lifesavers	with	an	additional	149,000	passive	members	
(o’connell	2008,	p.	131).	From	1997	to	2008	the	proportion	of	patrolling	lifesavers	declined,	
falling	from	about	33	percent	to	17	percent.	this	fall	in	the	proportion	of	patrolling	members	
may	reflect	what	is	suggested	by	economic	theory.	
this	paper’s	goal	is	to	test	whether	economic	theory	holds	in	practice;	Are services at 
some beaches in Australia less than the level desired by beach users?	to	answer	this	question	
beach	users	in	Australia	and	the	United	States	were	asked	their	willingness	to	pay	(WtP)	
for	additional	services.	the	value	of	additional	services,	referred	to	as	‘marginal	value’,	was	
then	compared	to	the	additional	cost	of	supply.	Ceteris paribus,	if	benefits	exceed	costs	at	the	
margin,	additional	lifesaving	services	are	required.	
the	paper	investigates	the	rivalry	among	users	of	safe	bathing	services	to	help	explain	
people’s	WtP.	Where	rivalry	or	shortages	exist,	there	may	be	pressure	to	substitute	or	supplement	
volunteering	lifesavers	with	paid	lifeguards	in	order	to	extend	services.	thus,	the	paper	also	
considers	this	substitution.
the	paper	is	set-out	in	the	following	manner.	Firstly,	safe	bathing	services	are	described	
to	explain	the	theoretical	reasons	for	under	provision.	Secondly,	the	methods	are	presented.	
thirdly,	the	results	are	presented	in	two	parts:	those	to	test	elicitation	methods	and	relative	
values	 of	 additional	 lifesavers	 versus	 lifeguards;	 and	 those	 from	 a	 number	 of	 regression	
analyses	used	to	help	explain	users’	WtP	including	rivalry.	Estimates	of	mean	WtP	bids	from	
the	regression	models	are	then	presented	and	compared	with	marginal	costs	to	highlight	the	
need	for	additional	services	or	‘saviours’.	the	final	section	concludes	with	recommendations	
for	policy	makers	and	those	who	undertake	valuation	studies.
II.	dEScrIPtIon	oF	SAFE	BAtHInG	SErVIcES	In		
AUStrALIA	And	tHE	UnItEd	StAtES
Safe	bathing	service	providers	take	two	forms	in	Australia:	the	volunteer	lifesaver	and	the	paid	
lifeguard.	the	services	are	complementary,	with	lifesavers	operating	over	weekends	during	
summer	and	lifeguards	usually	operating	during	the	working	week.	Also,	where	lifesavers	are	
not	available,	lifeguards	often	operate.	typically,	clubs	of	SLSA	provide	lifesaving	services	
while	local	government	authorities,	the	Australian	Professional	Lifeguard	Association,	or	the	
state	headquarters	of	SLSA	provide	lifeguard	services.
In	the	United	States,	the	lifeguard	services	provided	depend	on	the	jurisdiction	of	a	given	
beach	(Federal,	State	or	county).	In	the	early	20th	century	there	were	voluntary	lifesavers	
in	the	United	States	but	 today	there	are	none	(Blackwell	2003).	the	demise	of	volunteers	
may	have	arisen	from	concerns	about	beach	accidents	and	liability	claims.	However,	with	no	
volunteers	the	community	and	society	in	general	loses	because	lifesaving	services	provide	
broader	social	benefits	beyond	those	of	a	safe	place	to	swim.
boyd dirk blAckwEll And clEmEnt AllAn tisdEll 
211
2.1 The Economic Nature of Lifesaving and Lifeguard Services
Lifesaving	and	lifeguard	services	are	commodities	with	a	complex	mix	of	economic	attributes,	
termed	a	complex	mixed	good,	and	may	be	categorised	as	follows:
1.	 the	service	of	being	‘saved’	if	one	gets	into	trouble	in	the	surf	–	private	but	shared	with	
pure	public	good	consequences	(see	3	below).
2.	 the	 service	of	 identifying	 a	 safe	bathing	area	on	any	given	beach	or	monitoring	and	
providing	information	to	users	of	potential	hazards	–	shared	or	quasi-public	goods.
3.	 Benefits	not	related	to	the	recreation	or	use	of	a	beach,	referred	to	as	non-use	benefits	–	
pure	public	goods.
4.	 Benefits	gained	by	the	wider	community,	referred	to	as	spillover	benefits	–	merit	goods.
5.	 Benefits	derived	from	membership	of	a	surf	lifesaving	club	or	lifeguarding	association	–	
mixed	goods.
A	lifeguard	or	lifesaver	‘shared’	by	users	may	only	be	able	to	attend	to	one	emergency	at	any	
one	point	in	time.	In	a	monitoring	capacity,	they	may	be	able	watch	over	many	people	at	any	
one	point	in	time.	For	these	reasons	service	categories	1	and	2	are	termed	non-rival	up	to	a	
point.	Beyond	that	point,	these	services	become	rival	by	extra	users	impinging	on	the	benefits	
provided	to	all	users.	At	the	point	of	rivalry,	the	possibility	of	being	saved,	if	in	difficulty,	
may	be	reduced.	thus,	users	of	the	foreshore	may	be	willing	to	pay	for	additional	lifeguards	
or	lifesavers	to	reduce	rivalry.	
nevertheless,	any	rivalry	experienced	with	a	shared	good	may	provide	utility	to	some	
(bandwagon	effect,	safety	in	numbers,	visual	amenity)	while	to	others	it	may	provide	disutility	
(snob	effects,	people	who	enjoy	solitude).	these	complicating	factors,	combined	with	 the	
broader	benefits	provided	by	lifesavers	from	categories	3-5,	may	provide	contrary	findings	
for	an	individual’s	utility	derived	from	an	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard.	
2.2 Optimal Supply of Lifeguards and Lifesavers
While	the	services	provided	by	lifeguards	and	lifesavers	are	complex	and	mixed	in	nature,	
this	study	ascertained	the	value	of	extra	safety	services	provided	by	an	additional	and	fully	
equipped	lifeguard	or	lifesaver:	categories	1	&	2	above.	With	open	access,	these	safety	services	
are	typically	shared	by	beach	users	and	thus	present	a	number	of	problems	resulting	in	their	
under	provision:
•	 the	 free	 rider	problem	where	 some	 individuals	 freely	 ‘ride’,	without	payment,	 on	 the	
supply	of	these	services	by	others;	
•	 the	inability	of	the	private	sector	to	provide	the	best	supply	of	the	service	even	though	it	
may	provide	some	of	the	service;	and	
•	 the	need	for	different	prices	for	users	which	may	be	difficult	to	implement.	
compounding	problems	may	mean	no	provision	of	 the	service.	tisdell	 (2005,	chapter	3)	
provides	a	detailed	discussion	of	these	problems	for	the	conservation	of	nature.
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III.	mEtHodS
Given	theory	suggested	that	services	were	likely	to	be	underprovided,	the	contingent	valuation	
method	was	used	 to	survey	beach	users	 in	 the	United	States	and	Australia	 to	obtain	 their	
willingness	to	pay	for	an	additional	services.	the	method	values	people’s	preferences	for	services	
or	goods	not	yet	provided,	asking	them	for	their	WtP	for	a	good	contingent	on	its	provision.	
the	contingent	valuation	method	suffers	from	a	number	of	biases	but	most	of	these	can	be	
eliminated	with	pretesting	and	correct	design	and	implementation	(Bateman	and	turner	1993;	
Pearce,	Atkinson,	and	mourato	2006).	mitchell	and	carson	(1990)	and	the	US,	office	of	the	
Federal	registry	(1993)	provides	a	discussion	of	the	appropriate	use	of	contingent	valuation.
regardless	of	the	method	chosen,	sampling	error	also	needs	to	be	reduced.	to	do	this,	a	
systematic	sampling	method	was	used	to	survey	beach	users.	moving	from	one	end	of	the	
beach	 to	 the	other,	one	 individual	from	every	 third	group	of	beach	users	was	selected	for	
questioning.	Systematic	sample	selection	combines	the	benefits	of	both	simple	random	and	
stratified	sampling.	the	method	provides	efficiency	gains	for	sample	estimates	as	compared	with	
stratified	sampling	or	simple	random	sampling.	the	process	is	still	random	and	independent.	
However,	 by	 systematically	 selecting	 sample	members	 the	 resulting	 sample	 is	 expected,	
in	practice,	to	be	geographically	more	representative	of	the	population	of	beach	users	than	
samples	gained	via	other	methods.
Beach	sites,	as	listed	in	Table 1,	were	selected	in	an	efficient	manner	according	to	those	
renowned	for	high	visitation	and	convenience	from	main	transport	routes	for	the	first	author.	
In	Australia,	the	majority	of	respondents	(140)	came	from	mooloolaba	beach,	100	km	north	of	
Brisbane,	on	the	Sunshine	coast	in	Queensland.	other	users	were	interviewed	from	Kawana	
beach	which	lies	to	the	south	of	mooloolaba	and	Alex	and	maroochydore	beaches	which	lie	
to	the	north.	A	small	sub-sample	of	the	Australian	survey	came	from	cottesloe,	south	west	of	
Perth	in	Western	Australia.	In	the	US,	29	people	were	interviewed	from	South	miami	and	Fort	
Lauderdale	beaches	of	Florida	and	62	users	were	interviewed	from	several	Waikiki	beaches	
on	the	island	of	o’ahu,	Hawaii.	the	sample	sizes	(n),	day	and	date	of	interview	for	various	
sites	are	provided	in	Table 1.
3.1 WTP Questions
Beach	users	were	asked	whether	they	would	be	WtP	per	person	per	visit	for	an	extra	lifesaver	
or	lifeguard	dependent	on	the	service	provided	at	the	time	of	the	survey.	the	extra	lifesaver	
or	guard	would	patrol	outside	the	flagged	area	thus,	providing	an	extended	sphere	of	safety.	
If	lifesavers	were	on	duty,	the	WtP	would	be	for	an	extra	lifesaver	or,	if	lifeguards	were	on	
duty,	 for	an	extra	 lifeguard.	Where	no	service	was	provided	 then	 the	bids	represented	 the	
value	of	one	lifeguard	or	lifesaver.	the	present	level	of	lifeguards	or	lifesavers	(and	associated	
equipment)	was	described	to	respondents	and	recorded	hourly.	
the	next	question	assessed	the	amount	of	WtP.	Various	elicitation	methods	were	used	to	
gain	these	amounts.	these	methods	and	service	types	(lifesaver	or	lifeguard)	are	outlined	for	
the	sites	in	Table 1.	the	contingent	valuation	questions	can	be	provided	by	the	corresponding	
author	upon	request.
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to	make	 the	 questions	 realistic,	 respondents	were	 reminded	 in	 the	Australian	 survey	
instrument	of	their	budget	constraints	when	asked	their	WtP.	Interviewers	also	asked	respondents	
to	be	honest	in	answering	the	questions	in	the	survey.	In	addition,	to	check	the	validity	of	WtP	
bids,	interviewers	asked	respondents	to	nominate	a	private	good	they	would	forgo	to	afford	
their	bid.	the	market	values	of	these	substitute	goods	were	found	to	be	statistically	no	different	
to	the	bid	values.	this	validating	of	bids	is	an	innovation	within	the	literature.	
3.2 Regression Analyses and Reasons for Bids
Because	the	bids	obtained	in	this	study	come	from	onsite	in-person	surveys,	they	suffer	from	
endogenous	stratification,	truncation	and	the	presence	of	non-negative	integers	(Shaw	1988).	
Endogenous	stratification	is	where	more	frequent	visitors	have	a	higher	probability	of	being	
surveyed	and	bias	WtP	for	the	average	visitor.	truncation	occurs	because	people	who	don’t	
use	the	beach	are	not	surveyed.	Lastly,	non-negative	integers	exist	because	people	can	only	
provide	zero	or	positive	and	genuine	WtP	bids.	these	expected	errors	are	corrected	statistically	
by	using	maximum	likelihood	and	censored	regression	techniques	such	as	tobit	(Shaw	1988).	
thus,	ordinary	least	squares	and	tobit	regressions	are	used	to	regress	bids.
Table 2:	List	of	Variables	used	in	Willingness	to	Pay	regression
Variable	name description measurement
BId Willingness	to	pay	per	person	per	visit	for	an	extra	
lifesaver	or	lifeguard
dollars	($),	AUd	or	USd	
depending	on	site.
Inc Annual	before	tax	household	income	for	current	
financial	year
$,	AUd	or	USd,	midpoint	
of	various	income	brackets
VISItS Annual	quantity	of	day	visits	to	the	site	by	
respondent
Whole,	positive	number
SAVErS no	of	lifesavers	on	duty	at	time	of	interview Whole,	positive	number
GUArdS no.	of	lifeguards	on	duty	at	time	of	interview Whole	positive	number
EdUc Years	of	education	undertaken	by	respondent Whole	positive	number
EdUc^2 EdUc	squared Whole	positive	number
oUtPAt175 Whether	respondent	was	175m	outside	the	patrol	
area	(flagged)
1	=	yes
0	=	no
SWImUP Whether	respondent	would	swim	on	an	unpatrolled	
beach
1	=	yes
0	=	no
AGE Age	of	respondent	in	years Whole,	positive	number
KAWAnA Whether	site	is	Kawana	beach	or	not 1	=	yes
0	=	no
toWErPA no.	of	towers	per	area	of	beach	face decimal	positive	number,	
m2
BAtHErBAKEr Whether	respondents	main	activity	was	bathing,	
swimming	or	sunbaking
1	=	yes
0	=	no
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the	bids	of	individual	beach	goers	(BId)	are	regressed	on	a	number	of	potential	explanatory	
variables.	Table 2	lists	and	describes	the	variables	expected	to	explain	bids.	the	variable’s	
units	of	measurement	are	also	provided.
the	Australian	regressions	are	expected	to	take	the	form:
BID = B0 + B1INC + B2VISITS + B3SAVERS + B4GUARDS + B5EDUC + 
B6EDUC2 + B7OUTPAT175 + B8SWIMUP + B9KAWANA
the	US	regression	is	expected	to	take	the	form:
BID = B0 + B1INC + B2VISITS + B3GUARDS + B4TOWERPA + B5EDUC 
+ B6BATHERBAKER
the	regressions	were	prepared	with	the	following	reasons	in	mind,	ceteris paribus.	
A	person’s	income	is	expected	to	have	a	positive	relationship	with	their	bid.	Higher	income	
people	are	likely	to	be	able	to	pay	higher	amounts	for	additional	services.	
People	who	visit	a	beach	more	often	are	likely	to	have	better	knowledge	of	the	beach	and	
surf	hazards	and	thus	be	less	willing	to	contribute.	Additional	visits	also	mean	more	cost	if	
bids	are	realistic.	tourists,	people	who	visit	less	often,	may	be	willing	to	pay	more	because	
their	incomes	are	typically	higher	than	residents	who	visit	more	often.	
Also	a	tourist’s	level	of	experience	of	the	local	surf	conditions	is	likely	to	be	less	than	a	
resident’s.	As	the	number	of	guards	or	lifesavers	on	a	beach	increases,	people	are	expected	
to	be	less	WtP	for	additions.	People	with	more	education	are	likely	to	provide	higher	bids	
consistent	with	the	economic	literature	(Bateman	and	turner	1994).	
Also,	people	who	sit	on	a	beach	outside	the	flagged	area	do	so	for	good	reason,	e.g.	to	
get	away	from	crowds	(snob	effect).	thus,	they	may	or	may	not	wish	for	additional	services	
depending	on	whether	these	services	are	seen	to	erode	their	solitude	or	raise	their	protection.
Similarly,	people	who	swim	on	unpatrolled	beaches	may	not	be	WtP	for	additional	services;	
they	believe	in	their	own	experience	and	decisions	or	are	seeking	solitude.	However,	some	
may	bequest	a	payment	for	the	safety	of	others.
Kawana	beach	is	included	as	a	dummy	because	it	is	more	exposed	to	swell	than	the	other	
Sunshine	Beaches.	the	beach	is	also	more	expansive	with	fewer	patrol	areas.
In	the	US	there	are	no	lifesavers	or	volunteers,	only	paid	lifeguards.	thus,	the	regression	for	
the	US	did	not	include	the	SAVErS	variable.	the	other	variables	have	the	same	interpretation	
as	those	for	Australia.	the	extra	variables	in	the	US	are	included	because	people	who	are	
bathing,	sunbaking	or	swimming	are	more	likely	to	need	the	extra	services	than	say	surfers	who	
have	aquatic	aids	and	whose	opportunity	for	catching	an	ideal	wave	is	reduced	by	additional	
services.	the	United	States’	open	beach	plan	warranted	the	inclusion	of	the	BAtHErBAKEr	
and	the	towers	per	area	variables.	no	red	and	yellow	flags	are	used	to	show	a	safe	bathing	
area.	Instead,	towers	are	placed	at	equal	distances	along	the	beach.	the	more	towers	provided	
on	a	beach,	the	less	people	would	value	extra	services.
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IV.	rESULtS
4.1 Contingent Valuation Biases
the	first	set	of	results	tested	for	bias	in	the	bids.	observations	were	visually	compared	and	no	
evidence	of	interviewer	bias	was	found.	Starting	point	bids	influenced	final	bids	in	only	2	small	
subsets	(48	observations)	of	the	Australian	sample.	Protest	bids	amounted	to	14	observations	
or	about	5.6	percent	of	the	total	Australian	sample	and	5	observations	or	5.5	percent	of	the	
US	sample.	these	protest	observations	were	not	included	in	the	analysis	of	the	data.	of	the	
people	asked	to	undertake	an	interview,	1.9	percent	and	2.2	percent	of	people	in	Australia	
and	the	US	declined.	
4.2 Non-Parametric Results
to	help	answer	a	number	of	policy	and	valuation	method	questions,	the	mooloolaba	bids	were	
broken	into	4	groups	as	shown	in	Table 3	with	4	tests	of	differences	between	the	groups.	non-
parametric	tests	were	used	to	check	parametric	tests	because	the	sample	size	of	group	2	was	
small.	Bids	from	outside	patrol	times	(lifeguard	or	lifesaver)	were	excluded.
Table 3:	mooloolaba	on-duty	WtP	Summary	Statistics,	$AU
type mean median Standard	
deviation
n
(1)	Lifesaver,	bidding	game	(bg) 1.23 0.50 1.45 35
(2)	Lifesaver,	open	ended	following	double	
bounded	question	(db	+	oe)
0.68 0.50 0.82 17
(3	=	1+2)	Lifesaver	bg	and	db	+	oe 1.05 0.50 1.30 52
(4)	Lifeguard	bg 1.22 1.00 1.32 56
First,	the	bidding	game	(group	(1)	in	Table 3)	and	open-ended	(group	(2))	data	for	lifesavers	
were	compared	using	the	non-parametric	permutation	test	(Johnston	and	dinardo	1998,	p.	
360)	which	involved	10,000	replications,	and	no	statistical	difference	was	found.	
next	the	permutation	test	and	its	parametric	equivalent	found	no	difference	in	the	bidding	
game	bids	for	lifesavers	(group	(1))	and	lifeguards	(group	(4)).	
next	the	lifesaver	data	were	considered	as	one	sample	(group	(3)	=	groups	(1)	+	(2))	on	
the	basis	of	the	result	of	the	first	permutation	test,	and	compared	to	the	lifeguard	bidding	game	
bids	(group	(4))	and	again	the	there	was	no	difference	found.	
Lastly	a	non-parametric	median	test	(Pett	1997,	pp.	204-207)	found	no	difference	across	
the	groups	(1),	(2)	or	(4).
4.3 Regression results
the	Australian	regression	results	are	provided	in	Table 4.	the	results	of	regressions	for	
an	extra	lifesaver	are	compared	separately	with	those	for	an	extra	lifeguard	in	Table 5.	the	
United	States	results	are	provided	in	Table 6.
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All	models	were	found	to	be	overall	statistically	significant	at	the	5	percent	level	(See	F	
statistics	or	likelihood	ratio	tests	in	Tables 4,	5	and	6).	the	United	States	data	performed	best	
in	terms	of	goodness	of	fit	(adjusted	r2).	However,	for	cross-sectional	data	reliance	on	the	F	
is	preferred.	White’s	(1980)	heteroskedasticity-consistent	estimates	of	the	standard	errors	are	
presented	for	the	oLS	results.	Similarly,	Huber	or	White	robust	covariances	are	used	for	the	
tobit	results.	only	the	significant	results	are	discussed.
All	 coefficients	 from	 the	tobit	 regression	are	 interpreted	using	 their	marginal	 effects.	
Unconditional	adjustment	factors	for	the	models	were:	Australian	combined	0.847;	Australian	
lifesaver	0.802;	Australian	lifeguard	0.844;	United	States’	0.932.
4.4 Income
As	can	be	seen	from	Tables 4,	5	and	6,	only	in	the	combined	and	lifeguard	Australian	regressions	
was	before	tax	annual	household	income	(Inc)	a	significant	explanatory	variable	for	willingness	
to	pay	at	the	5	and	10	percent	level.	Higher	income	people	are	willing	to	pay	less	for	safe	
bathing	services	(for	each	$10,000	in	income,	7c	less	for	combined	and	8c	less	for	lifeguard).	
this	result	is	contrary	to	economic	theory.	Higher	income	people	are	expected	to	pay	more.
4.5 Visits
From	the	Australian	data	(Table 4),	for	each	10	visits	a	beach	user	makes,	s/he	is	willing	to	pay	
2c	(AUd)	less	for	an	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard	and	3c	(AUd)	less	for	an	extra	lifesaver	(Table 
5).	Both	are	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	In	the	United	States	(Table 6),	people	are	willing	
to	pay	8c	(USd)	less	for	every	additional	10	visits	made	(significant	at	the	1	percent	level).
4.6 Lifesavers, Lifeguards, Towers per Area
In	the	combined	Australian	data,	the	number	of	lifeguards	and	lifesavers	are	significant	at	
the	5	percent	level.	For	each	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard	provided,	beach	users	are	WtP	4c	
(AUd)	and	14c	less,	respectively	(Table 4).	For	the	Australian	lifeguard	regression	(Table 5),	
people	are	WtP	22c	(AUd)	less	(significant	at	1	percent	level)	and	for	the	US	WtP	is	highly	
significant	at	40c	less	(USd	or	63c	AUd	per	visit	with	exchange	rate	from	the	Economist	
31	dec.	1999,	p.	144).	respondents	in	the	US	were	WtP	about	83c	(USd)	less	for	an	extra	
lifeguard	given	one	extra	tower	in	the	nearby	vicinity	(significant	at	10	percent,	correct	sign).
4.7 Socio-Economic Variables
For	each	extra	year	of	education,	respondents	were	WtP	$1.60	more	for	an	extra	lifesaver	or	
guard	in	Australia.	In	contrast,	with	each	year	of	education,	USZ	respondents	were	WtP	37c	
(USd)	less	for	an	extra	lifeguard	(5	percent	level).	more	educated	beach	users	may	also	know	
the	risks	and	value	additional	services	less	with	an	open	beach	plan.
In	the	split	Australian	data	(Table 5)	for	each	additional	year	of	age	(AGE),	respondents	
were	WtP	2c	less	for	an	extra	lifesaver	(0.5	percent	level).	When	regressed	separately,	females	
in	the	Australian	model	were	WtP	more	than	males	(10	percent	level).
thE mArginAl VAluEs of lifEsAVErs And lifEguArds to bEAch usErs in AustrAliA  
And thE unitEd stAtEs
218
Table 5:	Lifesaver	and	Lifeguard	Bid	models,	Australia	(toBIt)
Lifesaver Lifeguard
Variable co-efficient
(std	errors)
z-ratio p-value co-efficient
(std	errors)
z-	sratio p-value
constant 3.028
(0.610)
4.96 0.000 2.811
(0.585)
4.81 0.000
Inc -6.83E-06
(4.95E-06)
-1.38 0.167 -1.00E-05
(6.08E-06)
-1.65 0.099
VISItS -0.00310
(0.00185)
-1.68 0.093 -0.00282
(0.00256)
-1.10 0.271
oUtPAt175 1.165
(0.460)
2.53 0.011 - - -
SWImUP -0.759
(0.363)
-2.09 0.037 - - -
Table 4:	Bid	model,	Australian	data
ordinary	Least	Squares	(oLS)	a censored	normal	(tobit)	b
Variable co-efficient
(std	errors)
t-ratio p-value co-efficient
(std	errors)
z-ratio p-value
constant -9.981
(5.238)
-1.91 0.058 -9.981
(5.136)
-1.94 0.052
Inc -8.00E-06
(3.90E-06)
-2.05 0.041 -8.00E-06
(3.82E-06)
-2.09 0.037
VISItS -0.00250
(0.00147)
-1.70 0.091 -0.00250
(0.00144)
-1.73 0.083
SAVErS -0.049
(0.023)
-2.13 0.034 -0.049
(0.023)
-2.18 0.030
GUArdS -0.163
(0.068)
-2.40 0.017 -0.163
(0.067)
-2.45 0.014
EdUc 1.888
(0.803)
2.35 0.020 1.888
(0.787)
2.40 0.016
EdUc^2 -0.070
(0.029)
-2.38 0.018 -0.070
(0.029)
-2.43 0.015
oUtPAt175 0.543
(0.284)
1.91 0.057 0.543
(0.278)
1.95 0.051
SWImUP -0.456
(0.243)
-1.88 0.062 -0.456
(0.238)
-1.91 0.056
n	=	235 r2	=	0.111
Adj.	r2	=	
0.080
F	=	3.53 0.001 Lg	L=-
458.1
Ave.	Lg	L	=
Lrc=27.68
-1.949
0.0005
notes:	a.	White	heteroskedasticity-consistent	estimates	of	standard	errors	and	covariance	are	used.	b.	Huber/White	
standard	errors	and	covariance	are	used.	c.	A	redundant	variable	likelihood	ratio.
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Table 6:	Lifeguard	Bid	model,	United	States
oLS	a tobit	(censored	Logistic)
Variable co-efficient
(std	errors)
t-ratio p-value co-efficient
(std	errors)
z-ratio p-value
constant 7.934
(2.682)
2.96 0.004 7.606
(2.435)
3.12 0.002
Inc 6.52E-06
(9.51E-06)
0.69 0.495 3.50E-06
(7.26E-06)
0.48 0.630
VISItS -0.00951
(0.00328)
-2.90 0.005 -0.00891
(0.00217)
-4.10 0.000
GUArdS -0.453
(0.143)
-3.16 0.002 -0.432
(0.121)
-3.57 0.000
toWErPA -1.101
(0.512)
-2.15 0.035 -0.887
(0.457)
-1.94 0.053
EdUc -0.402
(0.205)
-1.96 0.053 -0.401
(0.188)
-2.13 0.032
BAtHErBAKEr 0.636
(0.663)
0.959 0.341 0.778
(0.407)
1.91 0.056
n	=	85 r2	=	0.192
Adj.	r2	=	
0.129
F	=	3.08 0.009 Lg	L=-
1.66.3
Ave	LgL=-
1.95
Lr=23.34 0.0007
notes:	a.	White	heteroskedasticity-consistent	standard	errors	and	covariance	are	used.
AGE -0.028
(0.008)
-3.40 0.001 - - -
GUArdS - - - -0.261
(0.093)
-2.80 0.005
KAWAnA - - - -1.013
(0.456)
-2.22 0.026
nsavers	=	121
nguards	=	114
Lg	L	=	-232.7
Ave.	Lg	L=-
1.923
Lr=20.98 0.0008 Lg	L	=	-222.7
Ave.	Lg	L=-
1.954
Lr=11.51 0.0214
4.8 User Type
United	States’	users	who	were	bathing,	swimming,	or	sunbaking	(BAtHErBAKEr)	were	
found	to	be	WtP	73c	(USd)	more	for	an	extra	lifeguard.	
4.9 Position of Users, Congestion and Swimming on Unpatrolled Beaches
Australian	users	who	were	175m	or	more	 from	a	 safe	bathing	 area	 (oUtPAt175)	 in	 the	
combined	and	lifesaver	models	were	WtP	46c	(AUd)	and	93c	(AUd)	more	for	an	extra	guard	
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or	lifesaver,	or	lifesaver	respectively	(10	and	2	percent	levels).	oUtPAt175	is	only	relevant	
in	Australia	where	red	and	yellow	flags	designate	a	safe	bathing	area.	In	the	US	under	the	
open	beach	plan,	towers	are	placed	at	intervals	along	the	foreshore	with	overlapping	spheres	
of	surveillance.	thus,	congestion	occurs	with	a	safe	bathing	area	and	‘decays’	as	one	moves	
away	from	the	area.	the	distance	from	a	bathing	area	was	significant	rather	than	congestion	
on	the	beach.	Beach	width1	and	site	congestion	(users/acre,	total	users,	beach	users,	water	
users)	were	insignificant.
respondents	were	WtP	61c	less	for	an	additional	lifesaver	and	39c	less	for	an	additional	
lifeguard	or	lifesaver	where	they	had	previously	swum	on	an	unpatrolled	beach	(SWImUP).	
57	percent	of	Australian	respondents	had	swum	on	an	unpatrolled	beach,	7	(median)	times	per	
year.	the	reasons	for	swimming	on	an	unpatrolled	beach	are	illustrated	in	Figure 1.
Figure 1:	reasons	for	swimming	on	an	unpatrolled	beach
  
Particular activities  
e.g. surfing, to cool  
down 
19% 
Assess surf risks eg.  
if safe 
19% 
Assess surf risks,  
take precautions e.g.  
stay close to shore 
20% 
No patrol, outside  
patrol hours 
11% 
Solitude, less  
crowding or privacy 
12% 
Convenience and non- 
urban beaches 
10% 
Other 
8% 
Nil 
1% 
the	most	popular	reason	was	that	people	considered	their	ability	to	look	after	themselves	
and	considered	the	safety	of	the	surf	conditions.	the	second	most	popular	reasons	were	to	do	
with	undertaking	particular	activities,	especially	surfing,	to	cool	down	or	enjoy	the	beautiful	
surrounds.	the	next	most	popular	was	to	do	with	group	dynamics	e.g.	respondents	wished	to	
achieve	solitude,	less	or	no	crowds	on	the	beach	and	in	the	water,	and	privacy.	next	were	to	
do	with	no	patrol	being	provided,	or	that	it	was	outside	of	patrol	hours	or	the	patrol	season.	
the	last	was	to	do	with	time,	access,	convenience	and	they	had	swum	at	beaches	away	from	
urban	areas.
1	  the	following	were	exceptions.	Beach	width	was	significant	in	the	logistic,	censored,	tobit	and	
when	individually	regressed	but	not	in	the	censored	normal	regression.	the	number	of	water	users	
was	significant	in	the	simple	normal	censored	regression	but	had	the	wrong	negative	sign.	Both	
variables	were	found	to	be	insignificant	in	the	multiple	regression	case,	except	for	beach	width	in	the	
logistic	form.	distance	from	the	patrol	area	was	significant	while	beach	width	became	insignificant	
in	the	preferred	censored	normal	form.
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the	third	group	of	reasons	suggests	that	for	some	users	crowding	of the beach	deters	them	
from	the	safe	bathing	area,	an	example	of	a	snob	or	Veblen	effect	as	opposed	to	a	bandwagon	
effect.	crowding	of safe bathing services	or	the beach itself	is	captured	through	the	oUPAt175	
variable,	having	an	opposite	sign	to	the	SWImUP	variable.	the	number	of	water	users	across	
a	beach	when	individually	regressed	was	found	to	be	significant	(10	percent	level)	and	had	
a	negative	sign,	while	the	number	of	beach	users	was	insignificant	with	a	similar	sign.	the	
signs	for	beach	and	water	users	suggest	that	rivalry	is	complicated	by	bandwagon,	safety	in	
numbers,	visual	amenity	or	other	group	dynamic	gains	from	increased	rivalry.	When	included	
with	oUtPAt175	the	number	of	water	users	became	insignificant	suggesting	that	distance	
from	a	patrol	area	better	explained	WtP	rather	than	congestion	generally	across	the	beach	and	
not	in	specific	locations.	the	effects	of	these	variables	are	difficult	to	separate	into	those	for	
congestion	of	beach recreation	and	congestion	of	lifesaver and lifeguard services.
In	order	to	separate	the	two	effects	we	might	consider	theoretically	WtP	for	a	beach	visit	
versus	 that	 for	additional	 safe	bathing	services.	People	greater	 than	175m	from	a	 flagged	
patrol	area	are	WtP	for	additional	services,	while	those	inside	are	not	which	reflects	a	lack	
of	services	beyond	the	flagged	patrol.	the	numbers	of	beach	and	water	users	were	not	found	
to	have	positive	impacts	on	WtP	for	additional	services,	which	tend	to	reflect	group	dynamic	
effects.	 In	part,	 snob	effects	 appear	 to	be	driving	 the	negative	 relationship	with	WtP	 for	
people	who	swum	on	unpatrolled	beaches.	this	group	of	users	may	not	demand	the	services	
because	with	these	services	comes	crowding.	A	pressing	and	difficult	policy	question	is:	How 
do we protect these people from surf dangers? Is the open beach plan that is used in the US 
a way forward?	these	people	wish	to	avoid	crowds,	and	in	so	doing,	are	forced	to	recreate	at	
beaches	which	are	not	patrolled	and	may	be	unsafe.	Areas	of	research	that	may	help	to	answer	
these	questions	include	the	use	of	remote	sensing	and	surveillance,	education	and	signage	and	
innovative	patrol	approaches	e.g.	roaming	patrols	to	help	protect	these	user	groups.
these	results	provide	evidence	that	the	WtP	for	an	extra	lifeguard	or	lifesaver	results	from	
a	perception	of	rivalry	over	current	services	beyond	those	of	the	safe	bathing	patrol	to	areas	
lacking	sufficient	services	(positive	sign	of	oUtPAt175).	this	evidence	of	a	lack	of	services	
is	consistent	with	predictions	of	the	economic	theory	of	shared	goods.
4.10 Site Dummy Variable
the	 site	 dummy	 variable	 for	 Kawana	 beach	 (KAWAnA)	was	 found	 to	 be	 significant	 at	
the	3	percent	level	for	the	individual	Australian	lifeguard	model	(Table 5).	Beach	users	at	
Kawana	were	willing	to	pay	86c	less	for	an	extra	lifeguard	than	users	from	other	beaches.	
the	significance	of	the	KAWAnA	variable	may	be	explained	by	the	beach’s	length	(9km,	
Short	2000),	exposure	to	the	elements,	rough	conditions,	and	higher	annual	visits	per	user	
(with	a	large	local	resident	component).	these	results	do	not	lend	support	to	reduce	or	limit	
extensions	of	lifeguard	services	at	Kawana.	there	is	growing	community	concern	(as	indicated	
from	beach	user	respondents,	surf	life	saving	club	members	and	the	lifeguard	on	duty	at	the	
time	of	interview)	for	the	need	to	establish	additional	safe	bathing	services	well	to	the	South	
of	Kawana	Surf	Life	Saving	club.
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Figure 3:	Box-Plots	of	Household	Income	for	Visitors	and	residents	by	Site
Figure 2:	Australian	Box	Plot	for	resident	and	Visitor	Bids	by	Site
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4.11 Site Analysis of Bids
the	WtP	data	for	individual	sites	was	regressed	and	only	the	mooloolaba	model	was	found	
to	be	significant	(5	percent	level).	the	box	plots	in	Figures 2,	3	and	4	give	a	breakdown	by	
site	and	whether	respondents	were	residents	or	visitors.	Visitors	are	defined	as	those	staying	
for	one	night	or	more.
there	is	a	positive	correlation	between	WtP	and	income,	as	shown	by	comparing	the	box	
plots	in	Figures 2	and	3.	Kawana	differs	from	other	sites,	with	a	negative	correlation	between	
WtP	and	income	using	a	comparison	of	medians.	Kawana’s	visitor	box	lies	above	that	of	
residents	for	WtP,	which	indicates	a	positive	relationship	with	income.	However,	Kawana	
was	the	only	beach	that	had	higher	use	by	residents	(58.6%)	than	compared	to	other	beaches	
(cottesloe	33.3%,	mooloolaba	32.8%,	Alex	32.4%,	and	maroochydore	28.6%).	Also,	Kawana	
residents	had	a	lower	proportion	of	genuine	zero	bids	(23.5%)	when	compared	with	other	
sites	(cottesloe	50%,	mooloolaba	39.5%,	Alex	45.5%,	maroochydore	40%).	these	results	are	
sensible	because	people	who	are	likely	to	use	extra	services	will	tend	to	value	extra	services.	
thus,	tourist	beaches	will	tend	to	have	a	higher	WtP	by	tourists	and	local	beaches	by	locals	
(residents).	the	box-plot	in	Figure 4	provides	statistics	on	people’s	visits	per	year	by	site.
Unlike	 other	 sites,	cottesloe’s	 resident	 users	 have	 higher	 incomes	 than	 its	 visitors	 as	
depicted	in	Figure 3;	therefore,	its	resident	users	are	WtP	more	on	average	for	extra	services	
as	shown	in	Figure 2.	cottesloe’s	sample	size	is	small	and	inference	requires	caution.
Figure 4:	Box-Plots	of	Annual	Visits	for	Visitors	and	residents	by	Site
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V.	dIScUSSIon
First	let	us	interpret	the	results	from	the	comparison	of	summary	measures	for	mooloolaba	beach.	
For	valuers	of	non-market	services,	there	is	no	difference	between	bidding	game	estimates	of	
bids	and	open-ended	post-double	bounded	estimates.	Secondly,	for	policy	makers	considering	
substituting	 lifesavers	 with	 lifeguards,	 there	 is	 no	 difference	 in	 mean	 bids	 for	 volunteer	
lifesavers	and	paid	lifeguards	at	mooloolaba,	despite	one	costing	considerably	more	than	the	
other.	despite	this,	respondents	acknowledged	the	broader	benefits	from	lifesavers	compared	
to	lifeguards	by	favouring	a	hybrid	system	of	lifesavers	and	guards	in	preference	to	a	purely	
paid	system	of	lifeguards.	the	final	observation	from	the	comparison	is	that	the	parametric	
tests	conducted	on	lifesaver	and	lifeguard	bids	are	robust,	and	thus	are	reliable	when	drawing	
policy	prescriptions	about	the	ideal	level	of	services	on	a	beach	which	is	considered	next.
5.1 Implications of the Estimates for the Optimal Supply of Lifesavers and Lifeguards
the	regressions	results	provide	estimates	for	the	dollar	value	of	an	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard	
as	presented	in	Table 7.	these	estimates	include	data	from	both	on	and	off-duty	observations	
and	hence,	the	contrasting	results	with	Table 3.	the	estimates’	standard	deviations,	confidence	
intervals	and	medians	are	also	summarised	in	Table 7.
Table 7:	Estimates	of	WtP	per	Person	per	Visit,	1999-2000,	$AUd
type mean median Std	devn 95%	confidence	Interval	
for	mean
one	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard,	
Australia
1.43 1.00 1.81 1.20	–	1.66
one	extra	lifesaver,	Australia 1.35 0.50 1.81 1.02	–	1.67
one	extra	lifeguard,	Australia 1.52 1.00 1.80 1.18	–	1.85
one	extra	lifeguard,	United	States
	 ($USd1999)
2.61
(1.66)
1.57
(1.00)
3.42
(2.18)
1.87	–	3.33
(1.19	–	2.12)
the	United	States’	value	of	a	lifeguard	is	larger	than	the	Australian.	However,	one	should	
not	automatically	conclude	the	service	is	of	a	higher	quality.	there	are	many	factors	that	may	
account	for	the	difference,	such	as	the	larger	international	tourist	resort	nature	of	miami	and	
Waikiki	as	compared	with	say	mooloolaba.
A	guide	to	the	type	of	monetary	benefits	that	would	be	provided	by	an	extra	lifesaver	or	
lifeguard	can	be	gained	by	multiplying	the	derived	WtP	estimate	from	the	Australian	bid	
equation	in	Table 3	by	the	number	of	visits	to	a	beach	in	any	one	period.	With	half	a	million	
visits	to	a	beach	such	as	mooloolaba	in	any	one	year,	the	total	marginal	benefits	from	one	extra	
lifesaver	or	lifeguard	on	a	beach	are	substantial.	With an estimated 512,995 visits per year the 
total marginal benefits of an extra lifesaver and an extra lifeguard would be approximately 
$1,090,000 using a derived median of $2.12 per person per visit. Total marginal costs per 
annum for an extra lifesaver and lifeguard are about $135,000 as	estimated	by	Blackwell	
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(2003).	The difference between the marginal cost and marginal benefit provides a lower bound 
estimate of the net value of an extra unit of the dual service at almost $955,000. the	estimate	
of	marginal	cost	is	conservative	as	it	assumes	fully	equipped,	state	of	the	art,	mobile	safe	
bathing	providers.	the	marginal	benefit	estimate	reflects	an	open	access	value	and	ignores	any	
broader	social	benefits	(merit	good	nature)	of	safe	bathing	services	and	any	adverse	impacts	on	
the	ecological	health	of	the	beach	from	extra	services.	Ignoring	these	other	affects,	marginal	
cost	is	less	than	marginal	benefit	and	an	increase	in	the	number	of	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	
is	warranted.	this	conclusion	does	not	change	when	 the	costs	of	 raising	public	 funds	are	
considered	(Blackwell	2003).	Whether	the	marginal	analysis	is	considered	per	person	per	visit	
or	annually,	the	conclusion	is	the	same.	
the	marginal	costs	of	providing	an	extra	lifesaver	and	lifeguard	per	person	per	visit	to	
a	beach	on	the	Sunshine	coast	were	estimated	by	Blackwell	(2003)	at	10c	($AUd)	and	50c	
respectively.	the	lifesaver	would	be	supplied	across	the	weekend	and	the	lifeguard	would	be	
supplied	across	the	remainder	of	the	week.	comparing	the	sum	of	these	two	estimates	with	the	
derived	mean	and	median	bid	estimates	of	$2.12	and	$1.81	for	the	combined	service	shows	that	
marginal	costs	are	less	than	marginal	benefits.	the	levels	of	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	provided	
on	a	representative	beach	are	less	than	optimal.	to	improve	the	net	benefits	to	individuals	
and	society,	an	increase	in	number	of	lifesavers	and	or	lifeguards	at	the	margin	is	desirable.	
this	policy	outcome	assumes	a	static	state	of	demand.	With	rising	use,	the	difference	between	
marginal	costs	and	benefits	will	only	widen	and	the	potential	net	gains,	from	increasing	the	
number	of	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	on	beaches,	are	likely	to	rise.	Policy	makers	also	need	to	
consider	the	merit	good	nature	of	lifesaving	services	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	the	paper.
5.2 Qualification of Marginal Values
the	bids	measure	marginal	values	and	do	not	represent	the	average	value	across	all	lifesavers	
or	lifeguards	on	duty	at	the	time.	consistent	with	the	law	of	diminishing	marginal	utility	from	
consumption,	the	marginal	value	of	a	lifesaver	or	lifeguard	was	expected	to	decline	as	more	
lifesavers	or	lifeguards	were	supplied,	ceteris paribus.	Hence,	the	bids	do	not	indicate	the	
value	of	any	particular	lifesaver	or	lifeguard,	but	measure	the	value	of	an	extra	lifesaver	or	
guard	on	top	of	what	was	provided	at	the	time	of	the	interview.	When	there	were	very	few	
or	no	lifeguards	or	lifesavers	on	duty	then	an	extra	lifesaver	or	guard	will	be	of	greater	value	
than	when	there	are	more	on	duty.	thus,	the	estimates	from	on-duty	beaches	represent	lower	
bound	estimates	of	people’s	willingness	to	pay.	One cannot simply multiply the number of 
lifesavers or lifeguards by these estimates and then suggest that this represents their value to 
beach goers as this would be an underestimate of their true value.
VI.	SUmmArY	And	concLUSIon
this	paper	focused	on	the	shared	good	nature	of	safe	bathing	services	on	beaches	and,	consistent	
with	theory,	has	found	that	such	services	tend	to	be	underprovided.
differences	between	mean	and	median	willingness	to	pay	bids	were	compared	for	the	
mooloolaba	data	across	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	and	with	the	open-ended	post	double-bounded	
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and	bidding	game	questions	using	parametric	and	non-parametric	tests.	no	significant	difference	
between	the	bidding	game	and	open	ended	post	double	bounded	elicitation	methods	were	
found,	important	information	for	valuers	of	non-market	services.	Also,	for	those	policy	makers	
considering	substituting	or	 supplementing	volunteer	 lifesaver	 services	with	paid	 lifeguard	
services,	 survey	 respondents	made	 little	 distinction	 in	 their	monetary	 valuations	 of	 extra	
lifeguards	and	lifesavers.	However,	users	did	distinguish	between	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	
because	of	the	broader	benefits	(merit	good	nature)	provided	to	society	by	favouring	a	hybrid	
system	of	 lifesavers	 and	guards	 in	 preference	 to	 a	 purely	paid	 system	of	 lifeguards	only.	
Such	information	is	strategically	useful	to	policy	makers	given	an	environment	of	declining	
proportions	of	 active	 to	passive	volunteer	 lifesavers	 and	 the	need	 to	 seek	out	 appropriate	
incentives	for	attracting	new	and	old	volunteers.
Variables	such	as	number	of	lifeguards	and	lifesavers,	visits	per	year,	household	income,	
education,	age,	distance	from	a	patrol	area,	and	willingness	to	swim	on	an	unpatrolled	beach	
were	found	to	explain	willingness	to	pay	estimates	for	an	extra	lifesaver	or	lifeguard.	Australian	
respondents	who	were	greater	than	175m	from	a	safe	bathing	area	had	a	positive	WtP	response	
for	extra	services,	whereas	people	who	swum	on	unpatrolled	beaches	were	found	to	have	a	
negative	response	to	WtP	for	additional	services.	congestion	for	beach	use	was	found	to	
drive	some	users	away	from	patrol	areas	and	swim	on	unpatrolled	beaches.	this	should	not	
be	confused	however	with	congestion	or	rivalry	of	a	lifeguard	or	the	safe	bathing	area	per se,	
even	though	this	is	possible	when	sites	and	services	become	highly	congested.	the	possible	
relationship	between	distance	from	a	patrol	and	WtP	appears	to	reflect	people’s	perceptions	
that	services	outside	these	areas	are	not	adequate.	
the	story	about	people’s	preferences	inside	the	safe	bathing	area	is	a	little	more	complex.	
Factors	other	than	rivalry	may	be	driving	the	demand	for	extra	lifesavers	or	lifeguards	such	
as	bandwagon,	‘safety	in	numbers’,	or	visual	amenity	spillovers	from	increased	beach	and	
water	users.
nevertheless,	the	findings	suggest	that	the	levels	of	lifesavers	and	lifeguards	on	the	beaches	
represented	by	the	sample	data,	at	the	time	of	the	survey,	were	less	than	optimal	and	needed	to	
be	increased.	Such	an	increase	was	found	to	result	in	greater	net	benefits	to	individual	beach	
users	and	society	as	a	whole	from	increased	safety	services	on	beaches.	However,	there	are	
other	benefits	that	may	spill	over	into	society	from	the	increase	in	services,	especially	those	
from	extending	lifesaving	services,	as	identified	by	respondents	in	the	survey,	the	broader	
social	benefits	of	surf	lifesaving.	this	merit	good	nature	of	lifesaving	services	means	that	
lifeguards	are	imperfect	substitutes	for	lifesavers.	If	lifesavers	are	used	they	tend	to	provide	
greater	social	benefits	than	those	from	use	of	lifeguards	alone;	Saviours,	but	with	benefits	
beyond	the	souls	saved!	to	expand	the	analysis	here	an	assessment	of	the	ecological	impacts	
of	additional	services	is	an	area	for	future	research.
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